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from other Buddhist traditions” (pp. 102–3). Thus Gekkan’s charge that 
Saigin was taking a “mind-only” position with regards to the Pure Land 
could be read as part of a broader struggle over the value of comparative 
approaches to Shinshū doctrinal studies in general. 
In the end, Ducor argues that while Gekkan’s real motivations remain 
obscure, “the vehemence of his attacks may also be explained by a real 
problem engendered by Zen interpretations of the Pure Land that were 
developing at the time,” and does concede that Saigin’s own doctrinal posi-
tion may not have been purely orthodox (p. 114). Institutionally, Honganji 
and its abbots emerged from this dispute secure in their doctrinal and 
administrative authority over their own network of temples, benefitting 
from the shogunate’s mandate on familial temple registration (terauke) and 
thereby contributing to the government’s ideological control over Japan 
over the next two hundred years (p. 115).
Rounded out by a comprehensive bibliography and detailed glossary, 
Ducor’s Terre pure is a solid contribution to the field of Pure Land studies 
and a fascinating look into the early history of Shinshū doctrinal studies. 
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“Frontier,” or “saizensen” in Japanese, connotes novelty, fringe, and con-
tention. As the second in the Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy series, this 
work’s particular focus on “neglected themes and hidden variations” brings 
the reader out to the edges of the field conventionally known as the Kyoto 
School. Contrary to what one might expect, this liminality effectively offers 
a new place for centers of concern driving the broader fields of philosophy 
and religion today, such as the methodologies of systematic ontology vs. 
comparative literature, the ethics of autonomous rule-following vs. those 
of particularistic concern, scientific explanation vs. phenomenological 
description, liberalism vs. totalitarianism, and so on. Hence, the frontiers at 
stake here, so artfully traced by the papers in this book, are not limited to 
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the conventional frontier between East and West. They are, rather, the mul-
tiple frontiers currently being explored by scholars of Japanese philosophy, 
with new perspectives of relevance both inside and outside the field.
The work is distinguished, first of all, by the value it offers to a variety 
of backgrounds and depths of specialization. It is not inaccessible to begin-
ners, since care is often taken to explain the complex religio-philosophical 
concepts introduced, along with the relevant historical background to those 
concepts. It would, however, be mostly of interest to a variety of specialists, 
thanks to the diversity and complexity of the opinions represented therein. 
First and foremost, the series is a great resource of cutting-edge English-
language scholarship in a field where Japanese, German, and French schol-
arship has often forged ahead. This second book in the series is especially 
commendable for a diversity not limited to topic and discipline, but also 
extended to a diversity of specialized opinions on shared themes and inter-
ests. In the summary and critique of the work which follows, I try to make 
both kinds of diversity visible by discussing the essays in pairs or sets, 
which follow the order of the essays in the original book, but do not reflect 
actual divisions in the original text.
The specific new contribution made by each of the collected papers is 
succinctly explained in the introduction by co-editor Victor Sōgen Hori. 
Telling of the book’s birth at a conference in March 2007 at McGill Uni-
versity, Hori describes its intent to, “focus attention on the more marginal 
figures and less studied lines of thought in the Kyoto School” (p. 1). Putting 
flesh on the figures’ names, Hori’s introduction augments summaries of the 
book’s papers with pertinent historico-biographical and interpersonal details 
about the members, and “non-members,” of the school. Hori deftly avoids 
the danger of an editor well-versed in his topic by not drowning the reader 
in details before they set out to sea. The result is an informative and inter-
esting place to start reading.
The first few papers of the collection present a figure on the edge of the 
Kyoto School by bringing his relation to continental philosophy explicitly 
to the fore. With perspectives from phenomenology to comparative litera-
ture, the three separate accounts of Kuki Shūzō use his philosophy and 
poetry to focus on the experience of encounter central to his thought. They 
bring to our attention a figure who clearly deserves his recent rise in popu-
larity and interest.
The first paper, “Is There a Method to Chance? Contrasting Kuki Shūzō’s 
Phenomenological Methodology in The Problem of Contingency with that 
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of his Contemporaries Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert,” by Gra-
ham Mayeda, distinguishes Kuki’s approach to the problem of contingency 
from his neo-Kantian contemporaries. Unlike Windelband and Rickert’s 
shared interest in a scientific explanation of contingency, Kuki’s philosophy 
offers a phenomenology of contingency, which instead of deriving it logi-
cally from an analysis of necessity, describes the experience of contingency 
within our everyday lives.
In a tightly structured comparative argument, Mayeda argues that this 
methodological difference opens up face-to-face ethical possibilities in 
Kuki’s philosophy of contingency. In particular, the contingency of the 
everyday encounter between persons is said to accompany and be contained 
within the profound meaning of the encounter. Mayeda contrasts his own 
interpretation of this meaning with previous comparisons of Kuki’s philoso-
phy to bushidō and the Nietzschean notion of amor fati. For Kuki’s ethics, 
according to Mayeda, point towards a unique responsibility arising from the 
contingent encounter, which limits one’s own future possibilities.
The next paper on Kuki, “The Contingencies of Kuki Shūzō,” by John 
Maraldo, explains the fringe status of Kuki’s natural and existential phi-
losophy of contingency with reference to their basis in relative, as opposed 
to absolute, nothingness. This focus on a relative “non-being” in relation 
to “being” means that Kuki’s philosophy is dualistic—or even, as Maraldo 
postulates, pluralistic—in a manner unusual for the Kyoto School. While 
drawing knowledgeably from both Kuki’s later work, The Problem of Con-
tingency, and his doctoral dissertation, Contingency, Maraldo nonetheless 
presents a distinctly internalized understanding of Kuki’s notion of contin-
gency.
This paper makes the prevalence of contingency palpable by proposing 
that all appeals to necessity ultimately generate contingency. Maraldo illus-
trates this point by discussing intelligent design theory; drawing on figures 
in modern and contemporary philosophy, he shows how both sides in the 
debate inevitably end up in primal contingency. In addition to, as Maraldo 
calls it, this natural philosophy of contingency, the paper also discusses 
Kuki’s philosophy of selfhood. In the latter, a specific kind of contingency, 
as the recognition that things could be otherwise, takes on what Maraldo 
terms an existentialist meaning. This philosophy of selfhood is contrasted 
with modern universalistic ethical projects. Maraldo also distinguishes 
Kuki’s philosophy of selfhood from other forms of existentialism, since it 
does not have their usual emphasis on transcendence.
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Maraldo’s picture of a natural and an existential philosophy in Kuki 
poses interesting questions of comparison with Mayeda’s description of 
Kuki’s methodology as phenomenological.  The third and final paper on 
Kuki in this work, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an 
Inquirer: Kuki Shūzō’s version,” by Michael Marra, presents us again with a 
different perspective on related themes. In this third essay, Kuki’s poetry is 
used to present an alternative account of the encounter with the Other than 
that portrayed in Martin Heidegger’s “A Dialogue on Language between a 
Japanese and an Inquirer.” According to Marra’s interpretation of the poetry 
written by Kuki during his studies in Europe, the encounter with the Other 
is—in the case of a truly foreign other—ultimately impossible.
In this paper, Marra uses his own, excellent, translations of Kuki’s poetry 
to present a critique of Hegelian dialectic and Heideggerian ontology. 
Fundamentally, Marra argues that the Other these philosophers claim to 
encounter is ultimately a merely homogenous one. Not stopping there, how-
ever, he also asks how we can talk about heterogeneity, even if we do admit 
a critique of homogenous time and space, universal rational categories, and 
so on. In this regard, the explicit argumentation of the paper seems to offer 
little positive response, except to state that “the unnamed, unexpressed, 
un-articulated, are as powerful tools to make sense of life as any fully articu-
lated techniques based on purely technical terms” (p. 68). However, as Marra 
intimates at the end of the paper, reading and enjoying Kuki’s poetry is one 
such un-articulated act of encountering the Other, and in that regard, speaks 
volumes. 
The next pair of papers takes us away from Kuki and the debates among 
phenomenological, natural, existential, and literary perspectives, towards 
more publicly controversial questions about where the religio-philosophical 
meets the politico-historical. There has, of course, already been much work 
done to grapple with the Kyoto School’s ambivalent relation to the Japanese 
powers during the Second World War. These two new papers, by contrast, 
do not address such well-explored questions explicitly, but instead find a 
different point of access. Their work to explore the relationship between 
the political and the religious in the philosophy of two more fringe figures 
of the Kyoto School, Miki Kyoshi and Watsuji Tetsurō, leaves the concrete 
politico-historical questions about the School mostly out of the picture, but 
may offer new perspectives relevant to them.
The title of “The Subject of History in Miki Kiyoshi’s ‘Shinran’” plays 
on the dual meaning of “subject” to introduce the questions of self and his-
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tory central to Melissa Anne-Marie Curley’s contribution. More precisely, 
Curley analyzes the relation between the subject (shutai) and history in a 
contentious essay written by Miki about the Jōdō Shinshū patriarch Shin-
ran. Contentious as an unfinished and posthumously published work, Cur-
ley presents Miki’s Shinran essay against the backdrop of a debate as to 
whether Marxist or Buddhist influences are more prominent therein.  
In a clear and convincing argument, Curley explains that Miki’s later 
essay is neither anthropological, nor theological, but rather historiographi-
cal. The main line of this argument demonstrates that “in taking up the 
question of the Buddhist view of history, Miki is in fact writing through and 
about Marx” (p. 80). For the interior subjectivity at stake in this essay is 
not, according to Curley, that of the individual ego; it is, rather, a socio-his-
torical reality, and what is produced out of this realization (jikaku) is a new 
socio-historical reality. This internalized socio-historical reality does not, 
however, present the self as an example of a category such as class, and in 
this regard, Curley notes the distance Miki’s notion of existential religious 
equality has taken from Marxian categories of analysis. 
An earnest discussion of religious philosophy in connection with the next 
fringe figure presented in this collection of essays may sound surprising to 
those familiar with his best-known work. In fact, as we see in Bernard Ber-
nier’s intensely informative paper, “Transcendence of the State in Watsuji’s 
Ethics,” both politics and religion should be understood within the context 
of Watsuji Tetsurō’s ethical philosophy—which connects the two in ways 
that may, after all, justify surprise. Distinguishing Watsuji’s notion of the 
state from views of it as a “thing” or “contract,” Bernier explains how the 
state for Watsuji is not one thing amongst others within a society, nor is it 
the substantiality of wealth possessed in common, but instead the state is 
the locus (basho) in which a common ethical life is lived.
On this ground Bernier offers an alternative, sophisticated reading of 
Watsuji’s proposition that the state (kokka) is the ethical organization of 
ethical organizations (rinriteki soshiki no rinriteki soshiki). In addition to 
the more conventional interpretation of this statement to mean that the state 
is the highest level in an organizational hierarchy, Bernier explains that 
Watsuji’s notion of the state is of a sacred totality which enforces and guar-
antees ethics. The irreducible sovereignty of the state for Watsuji, while dif-
ferent from that of a personal God or abstract principles, has, nonetheless, 
a distinct sort of transcendence. According to Bernier, Watsuji found this 
sacred, transcendent nature hidden by the modern definition of a secular 
state, and best revealed by the Japanese imperial state. As Bernier also sug-
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gests, however, Watsuji has a distinct notion of sacred transcendence, inso-
far as the state remains a relative and limited totality.
As we have seen so far, the fringe of the Kyoto School can be a place for 
opening up new perspectives beyond conventional dichotomies. Both of the 
next two papers in the collection explicitly contrast Watsuji Tetsurō with 
certain ideals of modern Western philosophy. The two authors’ respective 
evaluations of this contrast, however, are diametrically opposed. Still, both 
authors share the task of drawing on Japanese philosophy in order to inform 
and critique current trends in other philosophical fields.
“Guiding Principles of Interpretation in Watsuji Tetsurō’s History of Jap-
anese Ethical Thought: With Particular Reference to the Tension between 
the Sonnō and Bushidō Traditions,” by David A. Dilworth, uses an analysis 
of Watsuji to make a more general point with regard to the discipline of 
philosophy as a whole. For, according to Dilworth, the dialectical and ago-
nistic patterns of interpretation in Watsuji’s approach to Japanese history 
exemplify, and in fact precede, post-modern hermeneutical practices. These 
hermeneutical practices, while poetically or mythologically valuable, are 
from Dilworth’s perspective inferior to a more universalistic approach to 
philosophy as globally perennial.
Presenting a distinctly interesting view of the history of philosophy, 
Dilworth traces the practice of hermeneutics along cultural divides to 
Hegel’s philosophy of history. Then, due to their having been carried on 
through Heidegger, Dilworth rues what he perceives as the present predom-
inance of these practices, and supports instead Kant’s earlier claim that the 
philosophy of history is not philosophy itself. From this critical perspective, 
Dilworth presents Watsuji’s history of Japan in terms of the dialectical and 
agonistic relation between sonnō (veneration of the emperor) and bushidō 
(way of the warrior) as having pre-modern, theocratic, tendencies. Taking 
issue with Watsuji’s claim to be uncovering patterns of ethical significance, 
such as the “pure and clear heart” (seimyōshin), Dilworth concludes that 
insofar as these patterns are based in vertical relationships, they are politi-
cal, as opposed to ethical concepts. 
In Erin McCarthy’s essay, “Towards a Transnational Ethics of Care,” 
the critique of the place of ethics in vertical relationships takes on further 
significance. Here, Watsuji’s ethics are once again contrasted with the mod-
ern, liberal, individualistic project, but from an entirely different evaluative 
perspective.  McCarthy contends that Watsuji’s conception of an irreducibly 
relational self can help to inform an ethics of care whose relevance would 
not be limited to a particular gender or culture. Drawing on sources from 
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Japanese philosophy, psychology, and care ethics, the crux of the problem 
addressed is the matter of exploitation. According to McCarthy, the liberal 
ideal of the individual is autonomous, and yet human beings are embedded 
within relationships. The issue with this gap is that “the reality of human 
dependence without morality results, often, in exploitation” (p. 123). Hence, 
what is needed is not only the recognition of care, but also an ethics of care.
In light of this need, McCarthy uncovers a positive significance in 
Watsuji’s conception of the human as ningen; this conception not only 
recognizes interdependence, it also proposes an ethics where neither the 
individual nor the social is given ultimate priority. Finding parallels with 
care ethics in Watsuji’s discussion of family and friends, McCarthy argues 
that despite his lack of feminist views, ignoring Watsuji’s account of the 
relational self would be detrimental to today’s feminist ethics of care. 
Conversely, since Watsuji’s account was intended to describe the human, 
McCarthy thinks that it may help avoid the reduction of an ethics of care to 
the feminine. Concretely, McCarthy suggests that Watsuji’s emphasis on the 
everyday interdependence of the human body could contribute significantly 
to an ethics of care.
Both of the two previous papers raise the question of particularistic 
as opposed to universal, or transnational, philosophy. The following two 
expand the conventional boundaries of the Kyoto School to include its 
Sino-Japanese context, where the role of German philosophy remains piv-
otal. Drawing dialogues between the Japanese Kyoto School and the Chi-
nese New Confucianists, both of the following papers continue to thematize 
this role, and suggest a broader, more comprehensive picture for philosophy 
today.
“Subjectivity, Rinrigaku, and Moral Metaphysics: Watsuji Tetsurō and 
Mou Zongsan.” by Lam Wing Keung, constructs a philosophical dia-
logue between a fringe figure of the Kyoto School and a representative 
of China’s New Confucianist movement. Lam uses this dialogue to make 
a broader philosophical point about a relation between differing notions 
of subjectivity and differing accounts of ethics. This relation is shown to 
be significant insofar as both Watsuji and Mou base their ethics in human 
subjectivity, as opposed to an examination of ethical standards.  The main 
distinction that Lam draws between Watsuji and Mou is one between, 
respectively, a social ethic of betweenness (Jp. aidagara), and one that is 
grounded in the metaphysical notion of Heaven (Ch. tian). Supporting this 
distinction is Watsuji’s influence from Heidegger’s ontology, and Mou’s by 
Kant’s moral metaphysics.  
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Lam also, however, distinguishes the originality of Watsuji’s and 
Mou’s philosophies by describing the distance they take from their respec-
tive German influences. For one, Watsuji’s notion of subjectivity differs 
from Heidegger’s insofar as the former’s notion of human subjectivity is 
always one of intersubjectivity, and this intersubjectivity has no ground 
other than the everyday relations of humankind. For the other, Mou argues 
in contrast to Kant’s de-ontology, that the subjectivity through which we 
approach ethics must necessarily be grounded in metaphysics. In conclu-
sion, Lam re-grounds the reader in the Sino-Japanese context by contrasting 
Watsuji’s notion of study (Jp. gaku) and Mou’s notion of study (Ch. xue), 
which are two terms based in a symbolic character that is used by both the 
Chinese and Japanese languages, and yet has a different nuance of meaning 
in each. 
The other paper to present a Sino-Japanese dialogue in this book is, “The 
Comparative Philosophies of Mou Zongsan and Nishitani Keiji,” by Xiao-
fei Tu, where the theme of cross-cultural dialogue is developed by bringing 
to fore the question of comparativist methodology. Tu’s main point is that 
rejecting all comparativist thought would effectively block other cultures 
from participating in world philosophy. To make this point, Tu addresses 
two sides of a critique of comparativism as being essentialist in its treat-
ment of traditional thought—in particular the use of modern Western 
philosophical categories to convey philosophy stemming from indigenous 
Eastern thought.  One side of this critique is that the modern philosophical 
terminology used, in effect, masks the originality of that which it attempts 
to convey. Another side of this critique argues that the parallels between 
the indigenous and Western forms are, due to present-day comparativists’ 
ignorance of the socio-historical conditions which gave rise to the former, 
superficial and naïve. 
Tu first answers this critique by presenting two case-study philosophies, 
from the Kyoto School in Japan and the New Confucianist movement in 
China, as being fundamentally comparative. He then demonstrates how this 
comparative nature of Nishitani’s and Mou’s philosophies signifies a use of 
their respective indigenous traditions to go beyond the mere repetition of 
German influences. Then, Tu addresses the other side of the critique with an 
argument originally used by Nishitani to criticise Eurocentrism. Here, Tu 
turns this argument against the supposed limitation of authentic scholarship 
to historical positivism or deconstructionism. 
The last four essays of the book focus on neglected themes and hidden 
figures more directly associated with the conventional borders of the Kyoto 
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School. The first two address themselves to the theme of “time,” which, 
despite being a central topic within the School itself, has had little treat-
ment in English scholarship on the School. The second of these two essays, 
as well as the essay which follows it, were translated by Robert F. Rhodes 
especially for inclusion in this collection. With their shared topic of the 
imagination in Nishitani’s late work, these two essays are also representa-
tive of recent work, groundbreaking, in the field. 
Finally, the second of these two translated essays, along with the very last 
in the book, stand on the ground where the Kyoto School has already gained 
some recognition. That is, they base their own original arguments regarding 
first sensation, then ethics, explicitly on the rubric of interpretation wherein 
the School is a self-conscious movement beyond ‘being-centred’ or ‘dualistic’ 
philosophy towards absolute nothingness or emptiness. By first applying this 
rubric to the novel theme of sensus communis and imagination in Nishitani, 
and then to a major contemporary figure in the tradition of the School, Ueda 
Shizuteru, the new directions point towards a future rich with possibility.
The first of this last set of essays, “Hidden Aspects of Temporality from 
Nishida to Watsuji,” by Jacynthe Tremblay, discusses time, the self, and the 
problem of representation. Tracing the movement from a vision of time as 
flowing out of the past into the future, to Nishida’s interpretation of time as 
a “continuity of discontinuity” (hirenzoku no renzoku), Tremblay explores 
the ramifications of this re-interpretation for notions of time in Kuki, 
Tanabe, Watsuji, and Nishitani. This discussion takes the reader across 
questions of how these notions of time re-interpret the past and future, how 
past and future are re-grounded in an absolute present, as well as problema-
tizes the relation between time and the self. Last, Tremblay asks what it 
means to represent absolute notions like time and self. 
Tremblay chose well in using Nishida’s response to Augustine’s aporia 
of time as a framework for interpreting other Kyoto School figures’ philoso-
phies of time. Over and above the interest of the paper’s content-based con-
trasts, its final contrast of ways that the absolute is represented in Nishida 
and Nishitani opens up important new questions about their respective 
methodologies. According to Tremblay, Nishitani’s philosophy illustrates 
the difficulty of representing an absolute present by his use of spatial meta-
phor. We see this use, for instance, in Nishitani’s description of the abso-
lute as an infinite openness below the world. The contrasting example of 
Nishida’s use of metaphor which Tremblay gives is that of the absolute as 
an unlimited circle whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is 
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nowhere. Tremblay presents such examples in order to argue that Nishida’s 
use of metaphor differs from Nishitani’s, insofar as the latter uses metaphor 
to present the reader with a “representation limit.”
The status of metaphor becomes especially thought-provoking in light 
of the next essay in the collection, “Sensation and Image in Nishitani’s Phi-
losophy,” by Hosoya Masashi. Continuing themes from the previous essay, 
Hosoya argues that Nishitani’s existentialist standpoint of emptiness (kū) is 
based in temporality, as opposed to ontology. For, in Hosoya’s view, the thor-
oughly existential nature of Nishitani’s philosophy means that his descrip-
tion of the absolute as emptiness must be realized at the pre- and post-
philosophical level of sensation, and hence in a place before representation. 
Hosoya traces this standpoint to the Mahayana Buddhist conception of nir-
vana as being immediately the world of birth and death (shōji soku nehan). 
From this perspective, Hosoya contends that Nishitani’s notion of imme-
diacy surpasses the creative nihilism of Nietzsche, insofar as Nietzsche’s 
standpoint of the will retains nihilism as a kind of metaphysical construct. 
The summative point of this contrast, that Nishitani’s standpoint of empti-
ness does not negate existence, but instead re-interprets it in terms of time, 
is especially profound.
In a discussion grounded in the influences of Nishitani as disparate 
and venerable as Augustine and Dōgen, Hosoya focuses especially on the 
processes of making being transparent (u no tōmeika) and the imaging of 
emptiness (kū no imējika). Connecting these two processes with the imme-
diacy of sensation, Hosoya describes how things, given their brute facticity 
(ganko na jujitsu), are nonetheless made transparent.  The significance of 
this description is that transparency is not a simple negation of the existence 
of things through which they become reduced to representations within a 
subject. Instead, Hosoya offers the reader Nishitani’s analogy of two rooms 
sharing a wall, as well as an illuminating piece of poetry by Sōgō to illus-
trate the standpoint of emptiness. 
The nature of the imagination is further explored in the next essay, “Nishi-
tani Keiji’s Theory of the Imagination: The Theory of the Imagination in 
‘Emptiness and Immediacy,’” by Ono Makoto, where Nishitani’s standpoint 
of emptiness is again clearly distinguished from that of contemplation. Con-
tinuing the theme of sensation and imagination in Nishitani, Ono focuses his 
paper on the question of why the imagination became so important a theme 
at the end of Nishitani’s career. His findings are meaningful for the philoso-
phy of religion as a whole, insofar as they address the status of image.
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In a subtle and well-researched argument regarding Nishitani’s notion 
of the imagination, Ono describes how it develops Aristotle’s sensus com-
munis within the horizon of Buddhist thought. Noting the challenges of 
doing so, given Aristotle’s distinctly non-Buddhist notion of the unmoved 
mover, Ono explains how Nishitani re-appropriates the sensus communis by 
getting behind Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle. That is, instead of empha-
sizing the identity of knower and known in thought thinking itself (noesis 
noeseos), Ono draws out Nishitani’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of 
sensus communis as having both passive and active aspects within sensation 
itself. What this means is that, according to Ono’s interpretation of Nishi-
tani, Aristotle could have recognized a kind of continuity between sensation 
and reason, and therefore points towards a standpoint, not only of unity 
between knower and known, but one that would be prior to the standpoint 
of knowing.
The essay that concludes this collection is “Letting Go of God for Noth-
ing: Ueda Shizuteru’s Non-Mysticism and the Question of Ethics in Zen 
Buddhism,” by Bret W. Davis. Alluding to Meister Eckhart’s characteristic 
phrase, “letting go of God for the sake of God,” Davis gives it a new look 
in light of the philosophy of the central contemporary member of the Kyoto 
School tradition. Davis’ main question in this regard is what happens to eth-
ics if one lets go of God as a transcendent foundation of values.  His answer 
responds to potential criticisms of Zen enlightenment as an end to all ethi-
cal judgment, or a reduction to the mere following of convention. Instead, 
Davis proposes that Zen’s anti-nominalism has something positive to offer 
ethics “as it cultivates a response-ability to the presence of unique singulari-
ties rather than a formula for subsuming particulars under universal rules” 
(p. 246). To this insight Davis adds the stipulation that cultivating response-
ability can de-construct and revitalize thoughtful discrimination and ethical 
deliberation, but not replace them. 
Davis bases this argument upon an interpretation of Ueda, against the 
backdrop of Eckhart, showing subtlety and depth. According to this inter-
pretation, Ueda’s non-mysticism (hi-shinpishugi) is a kind of de-mysticism 
(Ent-Mystik or datsu-shinpishugi), broken down by Davis into a four-step 
movement. This movement of de-mysticism is said to surpass Eckhart’s mys-
ticism, insofar as the former goes beyond union with the divine, to an abso-
lute affirmation of the everyday qua everyday. Accompanying this account 
of Ueda’s philosophy in terms of its distinction from Eckhart’s, are concrete 
reasons for why going beyond mysticism may be evaluated positively. Most 
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memorable, are the examples Davis gives from Ueda’s work detailing how 
non-mysticism can be found in the everyday practices of breathing and 
bowing.
I suggested at the beginning of this review that Victor Sōgen Hori’s intro-
duction would be an informative and interesting place to begin reading this 
book. Let me now suggest that, alternatively, one could also start at the end. 
A glance at the handy index of personal names provided at the back of the 
book—Abe, Adams, Aihara, Aitken, Akizuki, Alighieri, Amaterasu, Ames, 
Amida, Ananda, Adolfato, Angelus, Anselm, Aquinas, Arai, Arendt, Aristo-
tle, Aubenque, Augustine—would probably pique the interest of any scholar 
on either side of the traditional East-West divide, and indubitably please 
those currently working across it.
Granted, the geographical and historical breadth of this list might also 
raise qualms with regard to scope. I would, however, note that the histori-
cal facts of the Kyoto School, not only justify such a scope, but require 
it. With regard to the scope of this particular review, I have focused on 
the work’s arguments and implications with relevance to the field of phi-
losophy—especially German philosophy. Given the nature of the work, 
however, a review focused on topics currently being considered within 
religious studies—particularly Buddhist thought—would be equally valu-
able.
Finally, it is the scholarly integrity and care of the work’s contributors 
that help to prevent its breadth from becoming a methodological weakness. 
Moreover, the work has no cohesive meta-narrative within which to fit its 
various parts, and yet its diverse themes and figures are deeply inter-related. 
This inter-relatedness causes the work as a whole to exhibit an exceptional 
kind of unity for a collection of essays. Even contrasting opinions seem to 
but prepare the ground for future discussion and debate, and I hope that an 
ever greater breadth of readers continue to join the fray. 

